Abstract. It is well known that pretameness implies the forcing theorem, and that pretameness is characterized by the preservation of the axioms of ZF − , that is ZF without the power set axiom, or equivalently, by the preservation of the axiom scheme of replacement, for class forcing over models of ZF. We show that pretameness in fact has various other characterizations, for instance in terms of the forcing theorem, the preservation of the axiom scheme of separation, the forcing equivalence of partial orders and their dense suborders, and the existence of nice names for sets of ordinals. These results show that pretameness is a strong dividing line between well and badly behaved notions of class forcing, and that it is exactly the right notion to consider in applications of class forcing. Furthermore, for most properties under consideration, we also present a corresponding characterization of the Ord-chain condition.
Introduction
This paper is motivated by the question which properties of set forcing carry over to the context of class forcing, in particular for pretame notions of class forcing, and for notions of class forcing with the Ord-chain condition. We show that the properties mentioned in the abstract hold for all pretame notions of class forcing, and that they can in fact be used to characterize pretameness and the Ord-chain condition in various ways. A list of the main results of this paper can be found at the end of this section. In order to properly state them, we will need to introduce our setup together with some basic notation. This is mostly the same as in [HKL + 16] .
We will work with transitive second-order models of set theory, that is models of the form M = M, C , where M is transitive and denotes the collection of sets of M and C denotes the collection of classes of M.
1 We require that M ⊆ C and that elements of C are subsets of M , and we call elements of C \M proper classes (of M). Classical transitive first-order models of set theory are covered by our approach when we let C be the collection of classes definable over M, ∈ . The theories that we will be working in will be fragments of Kelley-Morse set theory KM, and mostly we will work within fragments of Gödel-Bernays set theory GB. By GB − we denote GB without the power set axiom (but with Collection rather than Replacement), and by GBC we denote GB together with the axiom of global choice.
2 By a countable transitive model of some second-order theory, we mean a transitive second-order model M = M, C of such a theory with both M and C countable in V. Most of the time, we will avoid using the power set axiom, however we will often make use of the following consequence of GB: Definition 1.1. A model M = M, C of GB − has a hierarchy if there is C ∈ C with C ⊆ Ord M ×M such that for α ∈ Ord
M
(1) C α = {x | ∃β < α β, x ∈ C} ∈ M ; (2) M = α∈Ord M C α .
If C is a hierarchy on M , then the C-rank of x ∈ M , denoted rnk C (x), is the least α ∈ Ord M such that x ∈ C α+1 . Remark 1.2. (1) Assume that M = M, C |= GB − . Suppose that C contains a well-order ≺ of M which is set-like, i.e. for every x ∈ M , C x = {y ∈ M | y ≺ x} ∈ M . Then the order-type of M, ≺ is Ord M and C = { x, y | x ∈ Ord M ∧ y ≺ x} witnesses that M has a hierarchy. Conversely, it is easy to check that every well-order of M in C that has order-type Ord M is set-like.
(2) If M |= GB − has a hierarchy and C contains a well-order of M , then C contains a set-like well-order of M . To see this, let C ∈ C be a hierarchy on M and let ≺ ∈ C be a well-order of M . Then we obtain a set-like well-order ⊳ of M by stipulating that x ⊳ y if and only if rnk C (x) < rnk C (y), or rnk C (x) = rnk C (y) and x ≺ y. (3) Without a hierarchy, the existence of a well-order of M in C does not imply that C contains a well-order of M of order-type Ord M . This can be seen as follows. Let N be a countable transitive model of ZFC in which CH fails and such that there is a definable wellorder of H(ω 1 ); assuming the existence of a countable transitive model of ZFC, such a model exists by [Har77] . Let M = H(ω 1 )
N and let C be the collection of subsets of M that are definable over M . It follows that M, C |= GB − and that C contains a well-order of M . Since CH fails in N , C however cannot contain a well-order of M of order-type Ord M . (4) If M |= GB − has a hierarchy, then it satisfies representatives choice, i.e. if for every equivalence relation E ∈ C there is A ∈ C and a surjective map π : dom(E) → A in C such that x, y ∈ E if and only if π(x) = π(y). Assuming the presence of a hierarchy, we will thus sometimes cite results from [HKL + 16] that assume representatives choice, without further mention.
We define GBC − to be the theory consisting of the axioms of GB − together with the axiom postulating the existence of a set-like well-order. Note that by Remark 1.2, (3), this theory is strictly stronger than GB − + global choice.
Fix a countable transitive model M = M, C of GB − . By a notion of class forcing (for M) we mean a separative partial order P = P, ≤ P such that P, ≤ P ∈ C.
3 We will frequently identify P with its domain P . In the following, we also fix a notion of class forcing P = P, ≤ P for M. Note that the assumption of separativity does not restrict us much, since if M satisfies representatives choice, one can always pass from a notion of class forcing to its separative quotient (see [HKL + 16] ). We call σ a P-name if all elements of σ are of the form τ, p , where τ is a P-name and p ∈ P. Define M P to be the set of all P-names that are elements of M and define C P to be the set of all P-names that are elements of C. In the following, we will usually call the elements of M P simply P-names and we will call the elements of C P class P-names. If σ ∈ M P is a P-name, we define rank σ = sup{rank τ + 1 | ∃p ∈ P τ, p ∈ σ} to be its name rank. We will sometimes also need to use the usual set theoretic rank of some σ ∈ M , which we will denote as rnk(σ).
We say that a filter G on P is P-generic over M if G meets every dense subset of P that is an element of C. Given such a filter G and a P-name σ, we recursively define the G-evaluation of σ as σ G = {τ G | ∃p ∈ G τ, p ∈ σ}, and similarly we define Γ G for Γ ∈ C P . Moreover, if G is P-generic over M, then we set
Given an L ∈ -formula ϕ(v 0 , . . . , v m−1 , Γ), where Γ ∈ (C P ) n are class name parameters, p ∈ P and σ ∈ (M P ) m , we write p in the ground model, and the second part, denoted as the truth lemma, says that every formula which is true in a generic extension M [G] is forced by some condition in the generic filter G. In the context of second-order models of set theory, this has the following natural generalization: Definition 1.3. Let ϕ ≡ ϕ(v 0 , . . . , v m−1 , Γ) be an L ∈ -formula with class name parameters Γ ∈ (C P ) n .
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if { p, σ 0 , . . . , σ m−1 ∈ P × (M P ) m | p M P ϕ(σ 0 , . . . , σ m−1 , Γ)} ∈ C. (2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all σ 0 , . . . , σ m−1 ∈ M P , and every filter G which is P-generic over M with
(3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the definability lemma and the truth lemma for ϕ over M. We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem if P satisfies the forcing theorem for all first order formulas over M.
We will frequently make use of the following observation. Proof. Let ϕ(v, x, C) be a first-order formula with parameter x ∈ M [G] and class parameters C ∈ (C[G]) n . Let σ in M P be a name for x, let Γ ∈ (C P ) n be class names for the elements of C.
We identify sequences of the form C i | i ∈ I for classes C i ∈ C and I ∈ C with their code { c, i | c ∈ C i ∧ i ∈ I}. In particular, we say that such a sequence is an element of C if its code is.
Note that by [HKL + 16, Theorem 1.3], the forcing theorem can fail in class forcing; in fact, even the truth lemma may fail for atomic formulae (see [HKL + 16, Theorem 1.5]). There are, however, many known properties of class forcing notions which guarantee that the forcing theorem holds (see for example [Zar73] , [Sta84] , [Fri00] and [HKL + 16] ). The most prominent such property is that of pretameness. The term pretameness was first used by Sy Friedman ([Fri00]), however the concept already appears in unpublished work of Maurice Stanley ( [Sta] ), under the name of predensity reduction, and is implicit in the work of Andrzej Zarach ([Zar73] ), in his concept of C-3-genericity, and the similar weak antichain property appears in [Sta84] . Definition 1.5. A notion of (class) forcing P for M is pretame for M |= GB − if for every p ∈ P and for every sequence of dense subclasses D i | i ∈ I ∈ C of P with I ∈ M , there is q ≤ P p and
It was first shown by Stanley in his PhD thesis ( [Sta84] ) that pretame notions of class forcing satisfy the forcing theorem over any model of ZF − . A much more well-known account, however over the stronger base theory ZF, was published by Friedman as [Fri00, Theorem 2.18].
4 For these reasons, and for the benefit of the reader, we will provide a proof of this result in a generalized setting at the beginning of Section 2, which we independently discovered before learning about Stanley's results, and which turned out to essentially follow the line of argument in a version of his proof in the unpublished [Sta] . Furthermore, we will show that in a certain sense, pretameness can in fact be characterized by the forcing theorem.
If M |= X ⊆ KM, we say that a notion of class forcing P for M preserves X if M[G] |= X for every P-generic filter G over M. Stanley observed ( [Sta84] , [Sta] ) that pretameness characterizes the preservation of ZF − over models of ZF. We will provide an easy generalization of these arguments to the context of second-order models of set theory in Section 3. 4 It is in fact easy to observe that ZF can be replaced by ZF − together with the existence of a hierarchy for the arguments of that proof to go through. Definition 1.6. We say that a notion of class forcing P satisfies the Ord-chain condition (or simply Ord-cc) over M if every antichain of P which is in C is already in M .
Note that if M |= GBC − , then for notions of class forcing for M, the Ord-cc is strictly stronger than pretameness. On the other hand, over any model of GB − + AC with a hierarchy that does not satisfy global choice, there is a non-pretame notion of class forcing which satisfies the Ord-cc (see [Kra16, Lemma 4 
.1.7]).
A property that is closely related to the forcing theorem, and that can be used to characterize pretameness and the Ord-cc, is the existence of a Boolean completion. We distinguish between two types of Boolean completions, depending on whether suprema exist for all sets or for all classes of conditions. Definition 1.7. If B is a Boolean algebra, then B is
(1) M -complete if the supremum sup B A exists in B for every A ∈ M with A ⊆ B.
(2) C-complete if the supremum sup B A exists in B for every A ∈ C with A ⊆ B.
Definition 1.8. We say that P has a Boolean M -completion in M if there is an M -complete Boolean B = B, 0 B , 1 B ¬, ∧, ∨ such that B, all Boolean operations of B and an injective dense embedding from P into B \ {0 B } are elements of C. Similarly, we define a Boolean C-completion of P to be a Boolean M -completion B of P which additionally is C-complete.
In set forcing, Boolean completions are unique: If B 0 and B 1 are both Boolean completions of P and e 0 : P → B 0 and e 1 : P → B 1 are dense embeddings, then one can define an isomorphism from B 0 to B 1 by setting f (b) = sup{e 1 (p) | p ∈ P ∧ e 0 (p) ≤ b} for b ∈ B 0 . Moreover, f fixes P in the sense that f (e 0 (p)) = e 1 (p) for every condition p ∈ P. In class forcing, this proof works only for Boolean C-completions (provided that they exist). It follows from results in [HKL + 16, Section 9] that Boolean M -completions need not be unique in the following sense. Definition 1.9. We say that a notion of class forcing P has a unique Boolean M -completion in M, if P has a Boolean M -completion B 0 in M and for every other Boolean M -completion B 1 of P in M there is an isomorphism in V between B 0 and B 1 which fixes P. The property that P has a unique Boolean C-completion is defined correspondingly.
In Section 4, we will investigate the relationship between the existence of Boolean completions on the one hand, and pretameness and the Ord-cc on the other.
A technique that we will use in many places throughout this paper is adding suprema of proper subclasses of conditions to class forcing notions P. We will make use of the following characterization of suprema: For a class A ∈ C with A ⊆ P, we say that p ∈ P is the supremum of A (denoted p = sup P A) if and only if (1) ∀a ∈ A a ≤ P p and (2) A is predense below p. It is easy to check that this corresponds to the usual definition of suprema as least upper bounds.
We now describe a general method of how to extend a notion of class forcing P by adding suprema. Let S = X i | i ∈ I ∈ C with I ∈ M be a sequence of subclasses of P. Making use of a suitable bijection in C, we may assume that P ∩ I = ∅. Now let P S be the forcing notion with domain P S = P ∪ I ordered by
For i ∈ I, we will usually write sup X i rather than i. In case that sup X i already exists in P, or that sup X i ≤ PS sup X j and sup X j ≤ PS sup X i for some i = j, instead of P S we need to consider the quotient of P S by the equivalence relation p ∼ q iff p ≤ PS q and q ≤ PS p for p, q ∈ P ∪ I, in order to obtain a separative partial order. Since I ∈ M and P is separative, all equivalence classes are set-sized, hence this can easily be done, and we will identify P S with this quotient in this case. We call P S the forcing notion obtained from P by adding sup X i for all i ∈ I. Note that by construction, P is dense in P S . Lemma 1.10. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem. If S ∈ C is a finite sequence of subclasses of P, then P S satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. This is an easy generalization of [HKL + 16, Lemma 9.3].
It will follow from the proof of Theorem 2.9 that this may fail for infinite sequences of subclasses of P. Example 1.11. We will frequently use the following notion of class forcing to motivate our results. M is non-pretame as witnessed by the sequence D n | n ∈ ω , where D n is the dense class of all conditions p such that n ∈ dom(p). Another way to see this is to observe that any Col(ω, Ord)
M -generic filter gives rise to a cofinal sequence from ω to Ord M , and thus induces a failure of Replacement in the generic extension (see Section 3).
Results.
Notation. Let M |= GB − and let Ψ be some property of a notion of class forcing P for M = M, C . We say that P densely satisfies Ψ if every notion of class forcing Q for M, for which there is a dense embedding in C from P into Q, satisfies the property Ψ.
For the sake of simplicity, if there is a dense embedding in C from P into Q, we will frequently assume that P is a suborder of Q. This does not constitute a restriction, since in the above situation, P is always isomorphic to a (dense) suborder of Q.
The following two theorems summarize the results of the present paper. Regarding Theorem 1.12 below, in a slightly less general context, that pretameness implies both (1) and (2) and that (1) implies pretameness is due to Maurice Stanley ([Sta84] , [Sta] ), and the equivalence of (4) and (5) forcing notion Q such that C contains a dense embedding from P into Q.
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(7) P densely has the property that every set of ordinals in any of its generic extensions has a nice name.
Given notions of class forcing P and Q for M = M, C |= GB − , given π ∈ C such that π is a dense embedding from P to Q, and given a P-name σ, we recursively define
Theorem 1.13. Let M = M, C be a countable transitive model of GB − such that M |= GBC − , and let P be a notion of class forcing that satisfies the forcing theorem. The following properties (over M) are equivalent:
(1) P satisfies the Ord-cc.
(2) P satisfies the maximality principle.
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(3) P densely has a unique Boolean M -completion. (4) P has a Boolean C-completion.
(5) If there are Q, π ∈ C such that π is a dense embedding from P to Q and σ ∈ M Q , then there is τ ∈ M P with ½ Q Q σ = π(τ ). (6) P densely has the property that whenever ½ P P σ ⊆α for some σ ∈ M P and α ∈ Ord M , then there is a nice P-name τ such that ½ P P σ = τ .
Whether pretameness implies Statement (6) of Theorem 1.12 was a question (that turned out to have an easy positive answer) posed to us by Victoria Gitman at the European Set Theory Workshop in Cambridge in the summer of 2015, and was one of the starting points of the research that we present in this paper.
The forcing theorem
In this section, we characterize pretameness in terms of the forcing theorem. Our first goal will be to verify that pretame notions of class forcing satisfy the forcing theorem. Let M = M, C be a fixed countable transitive model of GB − .
Definition 2.1. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M and let p, q ∈ P.
(1) If p and q are compatible in P, we say that D ⊆ P is dense below p ∧ q if ∀r ≤ P p, q ∃s ≤ P r (s ∈ D).
7
(2) We say that d ⊆ P is predense below p ∧ q if ∀r ≤ P p, q ∃s ∈ d (r P s). Moreover, if p ⊥ P q, we make the additional convention that only the empty set is predense below p ∧ q, while any set is dense below p ∧ q.
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We will make use of the following equivalent formulation of pretameness:
Remark 2.2. A notion of class forcing P is pretame for M if and only if for every p ∈ P and for all sequences
Let us fix some notion of class forcing P for M. By [HKL + 16, Theorem 4.3], in order to verify the forcing theorem for P, it suffices to check that the forcing relation for some atomic L ∈ -formula is definable over M. Let σ and τ be P-names in M, and let p ∈ P be a condition. In set forcing, one may define the syntactic forcing relation * P for atomic formulae recursively, by stipulating the following (essentially as in [Kun80, Chapter VII, Definition 3.3]).
(A) p * P σ ⊆ τ if and only if the following property (a) holds: for all ρ, s ∈ σ, {q | q *
(B) p * P σ ∈ τ if and only if the following property (b) holds:
To verify the definability of the semantic forcing relation P = M P for atomic formulae in the classical case of set forcing, one then proceeds to show that the relation * P , which in the case of set forcing is easily seen to be a definable relation, concides with P . Such string of arguments may be found in [Kun80, Chapter VII, §3], leading up to its [Kun80, Chapter VII, Theorem 3.6]. Provided that we have a class relation * P that satisfies Properties (A), (=) and (B) w.r.t. a notion of class forcing P, it is easy to observe that exactly the same arguments yield that * P = P for atomic formulae. That is, classical arguments yield the following.
Lemma 2.3. Assume that P is a notion of class forcing for a countable transitive model M = M, C |= GB − , and assume that *
Theorem 2.4 (Stanley). Let M be a countable transitive model of GB − , and let P be a notion of class forcing for M. If P is pretame over M, then P satisfies the forcing theorem over M.
Proof. We will show that we can define a class * P within M that satisfies properties (A), (=) and (B). We will not bother with defining * P w.r.t. equality, considering its instances as mere abbreviations for two statements concerning the ⊆-relation.
However, we will need to first define yet another auxiliary forcing relation, that collects forcing statements for which we have (set-sized) witnesses in M ; we may call this the witnessed forcing relation (for atomic formulae) of M. For R ∈ {⊆, ∈}, we define that p * * P σRτ if there is a set (1) If y ∈ Y is of the form y = q, µ, ∈, ν , then d y is a predense subset of P below q.
is a predense subset of P below q ∧ s whenever q P s, and the empty set otherwise.
In the above, we say that Y and D witness that p * * P σRτ . We write p * * P σ = τ to denote the statement that p * * P σ ⊆ τ and p * * P τ ⊆ σ. For R ∈ {⊆, ∈, =}, we define that p * P σRτ if the class {q ≤ P p | q * * P σRτ } is dense below p. We will verify that * P satisfies properties (A), (=) and (B), thus finishing the proof of the theorem. We start with three easy claims.
Definition 2.5. Given a P-name σ, we define the names appearing in (the transitive closure of) σ by induction on name rank as
Claim 1. Let p ∈ P and σ, τ ∈ M P . Then the following statements hold.
Proof. For (i), note that
Claim 2. The following statements hold for any p ∈ P, set names σ, τ ∈ M P and R ∈ {⊆, ∈, =}.
Proof. In order to verify Property (i), pick Y and D = d y | y ∈ Y witnessing that p * * P σRτ , and let q ≤ P p. If it happens to be the case that q, σ, R, τ ∈ Y , then we are done by Claim 1, (ii). Otherwise, let Z = Y ∪ { q, σ, R, τ }, and let E = D ∪ { q, σ, R, τ , d p,σ,R,τ }. Then Z and E witness that q * * P σRτ .
(ii) is immediate from (i), and (iii) follows directly from the definition of * * P . Claim 3. Assume that we are given a sequence
Then there are Y and D, both in M , witnessing that for every i ∈ I, p i * *
It is straightforward to verify properties (1)-(5) above in order to show that Y and D witness that for every i ∈ I, p i * *
Now we are ready to prove that the relation * P satisfies properties (A), (=) and (B). Let p ∈ P be a condition and let σ, τ ∈ M P set names. Assume that p * P σ ⊆ τ and let ρ, s ∈ σ such that p P s. Take q ∈ P with q ≤ P p, s. By our assumption, there is r ≤ P q with r * * P σ ⊆ τ . Let Y and D witness this. Then y = r, σ, ⊆, τ ∈ Y and hence d ρ,s y is predense below r. Let r
In particular, Claim 1 (ii) implies that r ′ * * P ρ ∈ τ . By Claim 2 (i), t * * P ρ ∈ τ for every condition t with t ≤ P r, r ′ , proving (a). Conversely, suppose that Property (a) holds for p, σ and τ and let q ≤ P p. We need to find r ≤ P q with r * * P σ ⊆ τ . By Property (a), for each ρ, s ∈ σ the class D ρ,s = {r ≤ P q | r * * P ρ ∈ τ } ∈ C is dense below q ∧ s. Applying pretameness in the sense of Remark 2.2, we can find r ≤ P q and a sequence
is predense below r∧s. Using Collection and Separation, we can find a set X ∈ M such that each element of X is of the form Y, D , where Y, D witness that t * * P ρ ∈ τ for some ρ, s ∈ σ and t ∈ d ρ,s . Using Claim 3, we can amalgamate the elements of X to obtain Y, D which witness simultaneously that t * * P ρ ∈ τ for every such
and let
By the definition of * * P , Z and E witness that r * * P σ ⊆ τ . But this means that p * P σ ⊆ τ , as desired. Assume that p * P σ ∈ τ and let q ≤ P p. By our assumption, there is r ≤ P q such that r * * P σ ∈ τ . Let Y and D witness this. Then r, σ, ∈, τ ∈ Y and hence d r,σ,∈,τ is predense below r. Let r ′ ∈ d r,σ,∈,τ be such that r ′ and r are compatible. By Property (2), there is ρ, s ∈ τ such that r ′ ≤ P s and r
′ witness that r and r ′ are compatible. Then by Claim 2, (i), t * * P σ = ρ, and hence by Claim 2, (ii), t * P σ = ρ. This shows that Property (b) holds. Conversely, suppose that Property (b) holds. Then by the definition of *
is a dense class of conditions below p. We claim that r * * P σ ∈ τ for every r ∈ D. Pick some condition r ∈ D, and let ρ, s ∈ τ witness that r ∈ D. By Claim 1 (i), s * * P ρ ∈ τ and hence by Claim 2 (i), r * * P ρ ∈ τ . Using Claim 3, we can take Y and D witnessing that r * * P ρ ∈ τ and that r * * P σ = ρ. Let Z = Y ∪ {r, σ, ∈, τ } and E = D ∪ { r, σ, ∈, τ , {r} }. Then Z and E witness that r * * P σ ∈ τ . But this means exactly that p * P σ ∈ τ , as desired. In [HKL + 16, Theorem 1.3], it is shown that the forcing theorem may fail in class forcing. The notion of forcing used to prove this adds a binary predicate E on ω so that ω, E isomorphic to M, ∈ . The idea is that if the forcing theorem was satisfied one would obtain a first-order truth predicate in the ground model. In this section, we will prove a density version of this theorem. The following easy observation will be a key ingredient for our proof.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of GB
− with a hierarchy, and let P be a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem. Then P is pretame if and only if there exist no set a ∈ M ,Ḟ ∈ C P and p ∈ P such that
Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame, that a ∈ M , and that p P "Ḟ :ǎ → Ord M ". Let
for x ∈ a. By pretameness, there are q ≤ P p and a sequence
Then q P ran(Ḟ ) ⊆β, hence p does not force the range ofḞ to be cofinal in Ord M . Conversely, suppose that D i | i ∈ I ∈ C with I ∈ M is a sequence of dense subclasses of P and p ∈ P is such that there exist no q ≤ P p and
M be the function defined by
Using the forcing theorem and Observation 1.4, we may choose a nameḞ ∈ C for F and a condition q ≤ P p in G such that the above property ofḞ is forced by q. But then q forces thaṫ F is cofinal in the ordinals -otherwise we could strengthen q to some r which forces the range oḟ F to be contained in some ordinal α and so d i = D i ∩ C α would be predense below r for every i ∈ I, contradicting our assumption.
If we additionally assume the existence of a set-like wellorder, we obtain the following strengthening of Lemma 2.6. Lemma 2.7. Suppose that M = M, C is a countable transitive model of GBC − and that P is a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem. Assume thatḞ ∈ C P and p ∈ P are such that
Then there is a class namė E ∈ C and q ≤ P p such that q P "Ė :κ → Ord M is surjective."
Proof. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem,
Hence, making use of a set-like wellorder, there is a sequence
for some r ∈ P and α ∈ Ord M such that A r,α is a proper class, and moreover each such class A r,α appears unboundedly often in C. Suppose that D is a class as in the statement of the previous claim. If G is P-generic over M with p ∈ G, let E : κ → Ord M be the function given by E(α) = β ifḞ G (α) ∈ D β . Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, by Observation 1.4, there is a class nameĖ ∈ C and a condition q ∈ G below p which forces thatĖ satisfies this definition.
Claim 4. There is a class
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, there is a condition r ≤ P q and some ordinal β such that r PĖ (α) =β for all α < κ. Then there is α < κ such that A r,α = {γ ∈ Ord M | ∃s ≤ P r s PḞ (α) =γ} is a proper class, since otherwise r forces that the range ofḞ is bounded in Ord M , contradicting our assumption onḞ . By the previous claim, A r,α ∩ D β is nonempty. Choose γ ∈ A r,α ∩ D β and s ≤ P r so that s PḞ (α) =γ. Then s PĖ (α) =β, contradicting our choice of r and of β.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.7.
holds for every ϕ ∈ Fml and every x ∈ M , where Fml denotes the set of Gödel codes of L ∈ -formulae with one free variable.
Using the previous lemma, we are now ready to prove the main result of this section. Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P satisfies the forcing theorem. Using Lemma 2.6, the axiom of choice, and Lemma 2.7, we can choose p ∈ P and a class nameḞ such that p P "Ḟ :κ →M is surjective" for some M -cardinal κ.
We extend P to a forcing notion Q by adding suprema p α,β for the classes 
Assume for a contradiction that Q satisfies the forcing theorem. We will useĖ to show that C contains a first-order truth predicate for M , contradicting our assumptions.
Proof. Let α, β < κ such that α, β ∈ E. Then α, β ∈ X and p α,β ∈ G. But by definition of ≤ Q , p α,β QḞ (α) ∈Ḟ (β) and therefore F (α) ∈ F (β) as desired. Conversely, suppose that x ∈ y in M . Since F is surjective, there are α, β < κ such that F (α) = x and F (β) = y. Moreover, there must be q ∈ G which forces thatḞ (α) ∈Ḟ (β) and so q ≤ Q p α,β . In particular, p αβ ∈ G and so α, β ∈ E.
The next step will be to translate L ∈ -formulae into infinitary quantifier-free formulae in the forcing language of Q, where ∈ is translated toĖ. The infinitary language L Ord,0 (Q, M ) is built up from the atomic formulaeq ∈Ġ, σ ∈ τ and σ = τ for q ∈ Q and σ, τ ∈ M P , the negation operator and set-sized conjunctions and disjunctions. We denote by Fml Ord,0 (Q, M ) the class of Gödel codes of L Ord,0 (Q, M )-formulae.
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Inductively, we assign to every L ∈ -formula ϕ with free variables in {v 0 , . . . , v k−1 } and all α = α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ∈ κ k an L Ord,0 (Q, M )-formula in the following way:
Note that, by [HKL + 16, Lemma 5.2], if Q satisfies the definability lemma for either " v 0 ∈ v 1 " or " v 0 = v 1 ", then it satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for all L Ord,0 (Q, M )-formulae, i.e.
and Q satisfies the truth lemma for every L Ord,0 (Q, M )-formula ϕ over M. The following claim will thus allow us to define a first-order truth predicate over M .
Claim 2. For every L ∈ -formula ϕ with free variables among {v 0 , . . . , v k−1 } and for all x = x 0 , . . . , x k−1 in M , the following statements are equivalent:
(1) M |= ϕ( x). (
Proof. Observe that since p P "Ḟ :κ → M is surjective", (2) always implies (3). We argue by induction on the construction of the formula ϕ that (1) implies (2) and that (3) implies (1). We start with the atomic formula " v i ∈ v j ". Suppose first that (1) holds, that is M |= x ∈ y. Let α ∈ κ k , let i, j < k, and let q ≤ P p be such that q PḞ (α i ) =x ∧Ḟ (α j ) =y. Take a Q-generic filter with q ∈ G. Since q ≤ Q p αi,αj , we have p αi,αj ∈ G. Moreover, α i , α j ∈Ė G , so (2) holds. Assume now that (3) holds, i.e. there is α ∈ κ k , i, j < k and q ≤ P p such that q PḞ (α i ) =x ∧Ḟ (α j ) =y and such that q Q (v i ∈ v j ) * α . Let G be Q-generic with q ∈ G. Then α i , α j ∈Ė G , and so p αi,αj ∈ G. In particular, this means that
Next we turn to negations. Suppose first that M |= ¬ϕ( x) and let α ∈ κ k and q ≤ P p with
Suppose now that M |= (ϕ ∨ ψ)( x). Without loss of generality, assume that M |= ϕ( x). Now if α ∈ κ k and q ≤ P p with
In order to see that (3) implies (1), suppose that α ∈ κ k and q ≤ P p witness (3). Then there must be a strengthenig r ∈ Q of q which satisfies, without loss of generality, r Q ϕ * α . By density of P in Q, we can assume that r ∈ P. This means that α and r witness that (3) holds for ϕ, so M |= ϕ( x).
We are left with the existential case. Assume first that M |= ∃v k ϕ( x). Take y ∈ M such that M |= ϕ( x, y) and let α ∈ κ k and q ≤ P p with q P ∀i < k (Ḟ (α i ) =x i ). Let now G be Q-generic with q ∈ G. By an easy density argument there must be r ≤ P p and β < κ with r ∈ G and r PḞ (β) =y. By induction, r Q ϕ * α,β . In particular, M [G] |= (∃v k ϕ) * α . The converse follows in a similar way.
Let Fml 1 denote the set of all Gödel codes of L ∈ -formulae whose only free variable is v 0 . As a consequence of Claim 2, the class Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 2.9 yields the following, with P = Col(ω, Ord)
M as a witness.
Corollary 2.11. Suppose that M = M, C is a countable transitive model of GBC − such that C does not contain a first-order truth predicate for M . Then there is a notion of class forcing P for M which satisfies the forcing theorem, such that there is an ω-sequence S of subclasses of P, for which P S does not satisfy the forcing theorem.
Given a notion of class forcing P, a condition p ∈ P, and a first order formula ϕ, it is easy to see that (as in the case of set forcing) p P ∃xϕ(x) if and only if the class of all q ≤ P p such that there is a P-name σ with q P ϕ(σ) is dense below p. The maximality principle states that it is not necessary to strengthen p in order to obtain a witnessing name for an existential formula. While this is a valid principle for set forcing, we observe that for notions of class forcing which satisfy the forcing theorem, this principle is equivalent to the Ord-cc over models of GBC.
Definition 2.12. A notion of class forcing P for M which satisfies the forcing theorem is said to satisfy the maximality principle over M if whenever p P ∃xϕ(x, σ, Γ) for some p ∈ P, some L ∈ -formula ϕ(v 0 , . . . , v m , Γ) with class name parameters Γ ∈ (C P ) n , and σ in (M P ) m , then there is τ ∈ M P such that p P ϕ(τ, σ, Γ).
Lemma 2.13. Assume that M is a model of GBC and let P be a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem. Then P satisfies the maximality principle if and only if it satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the maximality principle and let A ∈ C be an antichain of P. Since C contains a well-ordering of M , we can extend A to a maximal antichain A ′ ∈ C. It is enough to show that A ′ ∈ M . Clearly, ½ P P ∃x (x ∈Ǎ ′ ∩Ġ). Using the maximality principle, we obtain σ ∈ M P such that ½ P P σ ∈Ǎ ′ ∩Ġ. But then since rnk(σ G ) ≤ rnk(σ) for every P-generic filter G, A ′ ⊆ P ∩ (V α ) M for α = rnk(σ) and so A ′ ∈ M . Conversely, assume that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M and let p P ∃xϕ(x, σ, Γ). Using the global well-order in C we can find an antichain A ∈ C which is maximal in {q ≤ P p | ∃σ ∈ M P q P ϕ(σ, σ, Γ)} ∈ C. Note that sup A = p and that A ∈ M by assumption. For every q ∈ A, choose a name τ q ∈ M P such that q P ϕ(τ q , σ, Γ). Furthermore, for every µ ∈ dom(τ q ), let A q µ be a maximal antichain in {r ≤ P q | ∃s µ, s ∈ τ q ∧ r ≤ P s}. Now put
By construction, q P σ = τ q for every q ∈ A and so p P ϕ(σ).
Preservation of axioms
The following theorem adapts [Fri00, Proposition 2.17 and Lemma 2.19] to our generalized setting.
Theorem 3.1 (Stanley). Let M = M, C be a countable transitive model of GB
− . Then the following statements hold for every notion of class forcing P for M.
(1) If P is pretame and
then so is M[G], and if M has a hierarchy, then so does M[G]. (2) Suppose that M has a hierarchy, and that for every P-generic filter G, either Replacement or Collection holds in M[G]
. Then P is pretame.
Proof. For (1), suppose that P is pretame and that G is P-generic over M. Note that by Theorem 2.4, P satisfies the forcing theorem. It is easy to check that M[G] satisfies all set axioms of GB − except possibly for Separation, Collection and Union. Moreover, Collection together with Separation implies Replacement, and the preservation of Separation can easily be seen to imply the preservation of Union.
To see that M[G] satisfies Collection, assume that M[G] |= ∀x ∈ σ G ∃y ϕ(x, y, Γ G ), where σ ∈ M P , Γ ∈ C P and ϕ is an L ∈ -formula with one class parameter. By the truth lemma there is p ∈ G such that p P ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ϕ(x, y, Γ). For each π, r ∈ σ, the class
is dense below p in P. By pretameness there is q ∈ G which strengthens p and there are sets d π,r ⊆ D π,r for each π, r ∈ σ such that each d π,r ∈ M is predense below q. Using Collection in M, there is a set x ∈ M such that for each π, r ∈ σ and for each s ∈ d π,r that is compatible with r there is µ ∈ x such that s P ϕ(π, µ, Γ). Now put
By construction, M[G] |= ∀x ∈ σ G ∃y ∈ τ G ϕ(x, y, Γ G ). Next we turn to Separation. Let σ ∈ M P , Γ ∈ C P and ϕ an L ∈ -formula with one class parameter. We need to find a set name for {x ∈ σ G | ϕ(x, Γ G )}. For each π, r ∈ σ let
By pretameness we can take p ∈ G and a sequence d π,r | π, r ∈ σ ∈ M such that each d π,r ⊆ D π,r is predense below p. Then If ≺ is a set-like well-order of M in C then
for every α ∈ Ord M . Now we turn to (2). Suppose that C α | α ∈ Ord M witnesses that M has a hierarchy. Assume, towards a contradiction, that D i | i ∈ I is a sequence of dense classes and p is a condition in P which witness that pretameness fails. By our assumption there is a P-generic filter G containing p such that M[G] satisfies either Replacement or Collection. Now consider the function
By assumption, there is a set x ∈ M [G] with ran(F ) ⊆ x. Let γ be the supremum of all ordinals in x and let
By assumption, D is dense below p. Pick q ∈ G ∩ D and let i ∈ I such that q is incompatible with all elements of
Our next result provides a partial answer to [HKL + 16, Question 10.1], that is, over countable transitive models of GBC − , we show that Separation implies Collection, and hence also Replacement, in generic extensions for notions of class forcing that satisfy the forcing theorem. This will be an easy consequence of the following. Proof. Choose a set-like wellorder ≺ ∈ C of M . We pick a class nameḞ ∈ C P and r ∈ G such thaṫ F G = F , and such that r PḞ :κ → Ord M is cofinal.
As r plays no role in the proof to come, we may assume that r = ½ P . Let C ⊆ Ord
for p ∈ P and α ∈ Ord M such that A p,α is a proper class of M, or of the form
for p ∈ P, α ∈ Ord M and τ ∈ M P such that B p,α,τ is a proper class of M, and moreover each such A p,α and B p,α,τ appears unboundedly often in the enumeration
Claim. There is D ∈ C such that both C γ ∩D and C γ \D are proper classes of M for all γ ∈ Ord M .
Proof. This can be achieved by recursively defining D γ and D 
Since each C γ appears unboundedly often in the enumeration, both C γ ∩ D and C γ \ D are proper classes.
Suppose that D ∈ C is as provided by the claim. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, to show that Separation fails in M[G], it suffices to find Γ ∈ C P such that Γ G ∈ E is a subset of some s ∈ M [G] and such that there is no p ∈ G and no τ ∈ M P with p P Γ = τ . Let Γ ∈ C be a name for {α < κ | F (α) ∈ D}, which is an element of E, as the latter is closed under first order definability. The above set s will be equal to κ. Suppose for a contradiction that p ∈ G is such that p P Γ = τ for some τ ∈ M P . We first claim that there is an α < κ such that A p,α is a proper class. Assume that such an α does not exist. Then p forces that the range ofḞ is bounded in Ord M , contradicting our assumption onḞ . The above claim implies that (1) P is pretame. Proof. The equivalence of (1)-(4) follows from Theorem 3.1. The implication from (1) to (5) follows from Theorem 2.4 together with Theorem 3.1. The implication from (5) to (3) is provided by Theorem 3.3.
Boolean completions
As has been shown in [HKL + 16] , the existence of Boolean completions is closely related to the forcing theorem. Namely by [HKL + 16, Theorem 5.5], if M is a countable transitive model of GB − with a hierarchy, and P is a separative notion of class forcing for M, then P has a Boolean M -completion if and only if it satisfies the forcing theorem for all L ∈ -formulae. Thus the following is a consequence of Theorem 2.10. Proof. The proof of the first statement is exactly as for set forcing. Suppose now that B is the unique Boolean M -completion of P and suppose for a contradiction that A ⊆ B is a class in C which does not have a supremum in B. Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding sup A. Then since P satisfies the forcing theorem, by Lemma 1.10 so does Q and hence Q has a Boolean M -completion B ′ . But by our assumption, B and B ′ are isomorphic and hence sup A exists in B, a contradiction.
Definition 4.3. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing for M = M, C |= GB − . If A, B ⊆ P with A, B ∈ C, we say that sup P A = sup P B if
(1) A is predense below every b ∈ B and (2) B is predense below every a ∈ A.
conditions on the ground model M, the property of P of having the same generic extensions as all forcing notions into which P densely embeds is in fact equivalent to the pretameness of P. Let M = M, C be countable transitive model of GB − .
Definition 5.1. A notion of class forcing P for M satisfies the (1) extension maximality principle (EMP) over M if whenever Q is a notion of class forcing for M and π : P → Q is a dense embedding in C then for every Q-generic filter G over M,
(2) strong extension maximality principle (SEMP) over M if whenever Q is a notion of class forcing for M, π : P → Q is a dense embedding in C and σ ∈ M Q , then there is τ ∈ M P with ½ Q Q σ = π(τ ).
Definition 5.2. Given a notion of class forcing P and a P-name σ, we define the conditions appearing in (the transitive closure of) σ by induction on name rank as Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame. By Theorem 2.4, P satisfies the forcing theorem. Let Q be a notion of class forcing such that P embeds densely into Q and let G be Q-generic over M. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a dense suborder of Q. Fix a Q-name σ. We claim that σ
Then D q is a dense subclass of P. By pretameness, there is p ∈ G ∩ P and there are d q ⊆ D q which are predense below p in P. Now we define inductively, for every name τ in tc({σ}) ∩ M Q ,
. Conversely, assume that P is not pretame but satisfies the forcing theorem. Then there is a P-generic filter G such that Replacement fails in the generic extension M[G], and by Theorem 3.3, so does Separation (note that this is where we use the existence of a set-like well-order). Hence there is a set x ∈ M [G] and a first-order formula ϕ with a class parameter C such that {y ∈ x | ϕ(y, C)} / ∈ M [G]. By Observation 1.4, C has a class name Γ ∈ C P . Using the truth lemma, we can find p ∈ G such that p P Γ ⊆ σ, where x = σ G . By assumption, there are no q ∈ G and τ ∈ M P such that q P Γ = τ . For µ ∈ dom(σ) consider
Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding sup A µ for each µ ∈ dom(σ) such that A µ is nonempty below p, as described in Section 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a subset of Q and then P is actually a dense subset of Q. Consider the Q-name
Let H be the Q-generic induced by G, that is the upwards closure of
, yielding the failure of the EMP.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 5.3 we have only used the set-like well-order of M to show that every forcing notion which satisfies the forcing theorem and the EMP is pretame; for the other direction, it suffices to assume that M |= GB − has a hierarchy.
Example 5.4. Jensen coding P (see [BJW82] ) is a pretame notion of class forcing which over a model M of ZFC adds a generic real x such that the P-generic extension is of the form L[x].
Moreover, there is a class name Γ for x such that
, but there is no set name σ such that ½ P P σ = Γ. Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from Jensen coding by adding the suprema p n = sup{p ∈ P | p Pň ∈ Γ}. Since P is pretame and dense in Q, it follows that Q is also pretame. By Theorem 5.3, P satisfies the EMP and hence P and Q produce the same generic extensions. In particular, this means that if
Lemma 5.5. Suppose that M = M, C is a countable transitive model of GBC − . Then a notion of class forcing P for M satisfies the SEMP if and only if it satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc. Suppose that there is a dense embedding from P into some forcing notion Q. Without loss of generality, we may assume that P is a suborder of Q. We prove by induction on rank(σ) that for every σ ∈ M Q there isσ ∈ M P with ½ Q Q σ =σ.
Assume that this holds for all τ of rank less than rank(σ). Then for every τ ∈ dom(σ) there isτ ∈ M P with ½ Q Q τ =τ . For each condition q ∈ range(σ), let D q = {p ∈ P | p ≤ Q q} and choose an antichain A q which is maximal in D q . By assumption, we may do this so that q, A q | q ∈ range(σ) ∈ M . Then put
By construction, ½ Q Q σ =σ.
Conversely, suppose that P does not satisfy the Ord-cc. Then by Lemma 4.4 there is an antichain A ∈ C such that for no B ∈ M with B ⊆ P, sup P A = sup P B. Let Q = P ∪ {sup A} be the extension of P given by adding the supremum of A. Now consider σ = { 0 , sup A } ∈ M Q . We claim that σ witnesses the failure of the SEMP. Suppose for a contradiction that there is τ ∈ M P such that ½ Q Q σ = τ . Let τ = { µ i , p i | i ∈ I} for some I ∈ M . But then it is easy to check that sup P {p i | i ∈ I} = sup P A, contradicting our assumption on A.
Nice Names
This section is motivated by the observation in Lemma 6.2 below, namely that -unlike in the context of set forcing -there are sets of ordinals in class-generic extensions which do not have a nice name. We will characterize both pretameness and the Ord-cc in terms of the existence of nice names for sets of ordinals. We assume that M = M, C is a countable transitive model of GB − .
Definition 6.1. Let P be a notion of class forcing. A name σ ∈ M P for a set of ordinals is a nice name if it is of the form α<γ {α} × A α for some γ ∈ Ord M , where each A α ∈ M is a set-sized antichain of conditions in P.
Lemma 6.2. Let P denote Col(ω, Ord)
M . Then in every P-generic extension there is a subset of ω which does not have a nice P-name.
Proof. Consider the canonical name σ = { ň, { n, 0 } | n ∈ ω} for the set of natural numbers which are mapped to 0 by the generic function from ω to the ordinals. Let G be P-generic over M. We show that the complement of σ G is an element of M [G], but does not have a nice P-name in M . Suppose for a contradiction that there are p ∈ G and a nice P-name
where each A n ∈ M is an antichain, such that p Pω \ σ = τ . Let n ∈ ω \ dom(p) and choose α > sup{r(i) | r ∈ A n ∧ i ∈ dom(r)}. Then q = p ∪ { n, α } strengthens p and q Pň ∈ τ . Hence there must be some r ∈ A n which is compatible with q. But then n / ∈ dom(r), so p and r ∪ { n, 0 } are compatible. Let s ≤ P p, r ∪ { n, 0 } witness this. Then s Pň ∈ σ ∩ τ , a contradiction.
It remains to show that the complement of σ G has a P-name in M , and is thus an element of M [G]. For each n ∈ ω, consider the P-name
Then each τ n is a name for the least k ≥ n such that k / ∈ σ
Since by an easy density argument the complement of σ G is unbounded in ω, τ is as desired.
Definition 6.3. A notion of class forcing P for M is said to be (1) nice if for every γ ∈ Ord M , for every σ ∈ M P and for every P-generic filter G such that σ G ⊆ γ there is a nice name τ ∈ M P such that σ G = τ G . (2) very nice if for every γ ∈ Ord M and for every σ ∈ M P such that ½ P P σ ⊆γ there is a nice name τ ∈ M P such that ½ P P σ = τ .
Example 6.4.
(1) By Lemma 6.2, Col(ω, Ord) M is not nice. (2) Suppose M satisfies the axiom of choice. Then every pretame notion of class forcing P for M is nice. To see this, let γ ∈ Ord M be an ordinal and let p ∈ P and σ ∈ M P be such that p P σ ⊆γ. For each α < γ, consider the class
which is dense below p. By pretameness there exist q ≤ P p and a sequence d α | α < γ ∈ M such that for every α < γ, d α ⊆ D α is predense below q. For each α < γ, choose an antichain a α ⊆ d α which is maximal in d α , and let A α = {r ∈ a α | r Pα ∈ σ}. Then
is a nice name for a subset of γ and q P σ = τ . (3) If M |= GBC − , then every notion of class forcing P for M which satisfies the Ord-cc is very nice: Suppose that ½ P P σ ⊆γ. For every α < γ, we can choose an antichain A α which is maximal in {q ∈ P | ∃ µ, p ∈ σ [q ≤ P p ∧ q P µ =α]}. Since P satisfies the Ord-cc, making use of the global well-order we can do this so that α, A α | α < γ ∈ M . Then
is a nice name and it is easy to check that ½ P P σ = τ . We will need the following.
Lemma 6.5. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M. Let α ∈ Ord M be an ordinal and let σ, τ ∈ M P be nice names for subsets of α. If G is P-generic over M, then there is a P-name
Proof. Since σ and τ are nice names, they are of the form
where X β | β < α , Y β | β < α ∈ M . Let G be P-generic over M and let β 0 ∈ α be minimal such that Proof. Suppose first that P is pretame. It is straightforward to check that whenever there is a dense embedding π : P → Q in C for some notion of class forcing Q for M, then Q is also pretame. Then by Example 6.4 (2), every such Q is nice. Conversely, suppose that P is not pretame. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem over M (because every notion of class forcing does so over a model of KM -see either [Ant15, Lemma 15] or [HKL + 16, Corollary 5.8]), we may, without loss of generality, assume that P = P, ≤ P is an Mcomplete Boolean algebra, and we may also assume that P = Ord M . We will extend P to a notion of class forcing Q for M which is not nice and so that P is a dense subforcing of Q. By Lemma 2.6 there are a class nameḞ ∈ C P , κ ∈ Ord and p ∈ P such that p P "Ḟ :κ → Ord is cofinal".
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that p = ½ P .
For every α, β < κ and p ∈ P, let
Claim 1. For each p ∈ P there is α < κ such that for all β < κ, X p,α,β is a proper class.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Then for every α < κ there exists β α < κ such that X p,α,βα is set-sized. In particular, this implies that for every α < κ, {γ ∈ Ord M | ∃q ≤ P p [q PḞ (α) =γ]} is set-sized. But then p forces that the range ofḞ is bounded in the ordinals, a contradiction.
M ∈ C be an enumeration of subclasses of Ord M × Ord M such that each C i is of the form X p,α,β for some p ∈ P and α, β < κ such that X p,α,β is a proper class, and moreover each X p,α,β which is a proper class appears unboundedly often in the enumeration C.
We will next perform a recursive construction to build two classes D, E ∈ C, in a way that in particular each of D ∩ E, D \ E and E \ D has a proper class sized intersection with Y p,α = {γ | γ, γ ∈ X p,α,α } whenever Y p,α is a proper class. The construction of the classes D, E will satisfy further properties which will be used in the proof of Claim 2 below.
Let
be the lexicographically least pairs of ordinals in C i such that each pair γ k , δ k contains at least one ordinal not in F i ∪ {γ j | j < k} ∪ {δ j | j < k}, and γ 0 , δ 0 additionally satisfy (if possible)
and γ 1 , δ 1 satisfy in addition (if such exist)
In the successor step, we will enlarge
At limit stages, we take unions, e.g. if j is a limit ordinal, we let
Note that at each stage i such that C i = X p,α,α for some p ∈ P and α ∈ Ord M , each of the classes D ∩ E, D \ E and E \ D obtains a new element from Y p,α . Since there are class many such stages, each of D ∩ E, D \ E and E \ D has a proper class-sized intersection with Y p,α whenever Y p,α is a proper class.
Let a = {α < κ | ∃p ∈ P [p PḞ (α) ∈Ď]} and let b = {α < κ | ∃p ∈ P [p PḞ (α) ∈Ě]}. We extend P to a forcing notion Q by adding suprema for each of the classes
for α ∈ a and β ∈ b, as described in Section 1. Let p α = sup Q R α and let q β = sup Q S β for α ∈ a resp. β ∈ b. Since M is a model of KM, Q satisfies the forcing theorem.
We will show that Q is not nice. LetĠ denote the canonical class name for the Q-generic filter. Consider the Q-names σ = { α, p α | α ∈ a} and τ = { α, q α | α ∈ b} for {α < κ |ḞĠ(α) ∈Ď} and {α < κ |ḞĠ(α) ∈Ě} respectively. By Lemma 6.5, for every Q-generic filter G there is a Q-name µ such that µ G = σ G ∩ τ G . We claim that M Q contains no nice name for σ G ∩ τ G . Suppose for a contradiction that there are p ∈ Q and a nice name ν ∈ M Q such that p Q ν = σ ∩ τ . By density of P in Q, we may assume that p ∈ P. Since ν is a nice name, it is of the form
where each A α ⊆ Q is a set-sized antichain in M .
Let α < κ be as in Claim 1. We may assume that A α only contains conditions which are compatible with p.
Claim 2. For every
Proof. We first consider q ∈ A α ∩ P. By assumption p and q are compatible, and since P is a Boolean algebra, Z q = Y p∧q,α . Assume for a contradiction that Y p∧q,α is a proper class. Then by our construction, Y p∧q,α \ D is a proper class as well. Take γ ∈ Y p∧q,α \ D and r ≤ P p ∧ q with r PḞ (α) =γ. Let G be Q-generic with r ∈ G. Then p, q ∈ G and so α ∈ ν G = σ G ∩ τ G . On the other hand, sinceḞ G (α) = γ / ∈ D, we have p α / ∈ G and hence α / ∈ σ G . This is a contradiction. Next, suppose that q = p α and assume for a contradiction that Z pα is a proper class. Then Y p,α is a proper class, so Y p,α ∩ (D \ E) is also a proper class. Now let r ≤ P p and γ ∈ D \ E be such that r PḞ (α) =γ. Then r ≤ Q p α by the definition of p α . If G is Q-generic with r ∈ G, then α ∈ ν G . Since γ / ∈ E, we have α / ∈ τ G . This is a contradiction. Next, suppose that q = p β ∈ A α for some β = α. If there is some γ, δ ∈ X p,α,β such that δ ∈ D but γ / ∈ D ∩ E, then take r ≤ P p such that r PḞ (α) =γ ∧Ḟ (β) =δ and a Q-generic filter containig r. Since δ ∈ D we have p β ∈ G and so α ∈ ν G . On the other hand,Ḟ
So there can be no such γ, δ ∈ X p,α,β . Hence for all γ, δ ∈ X p,α,β , if δ ∈ D then γ ∈ D ∩ E. Suppose for a contradiction that Z p β is a proper class. Consider now the first stage i such that X p,α,β = C i . Since Y p,α is a proper class, there is γ, δ ∈ X p,α,β such that γ / ∈ F i . If there is such a pair which additionally satisfies that δ / ∈ D ′ i , then we are in case (1) in the recursive construction of D and E and so this would imply that γ ends up in D \ E and δ ∈ D. But we have already shown that this is impossible. So for every pair γ, δ ∈ X p,α,β with
By the definition of p β we have β ∈ D and hence by our previous argument γ ∈ F i . But then Z p β is not a proper class, which is a contradiction.
The case q = q α is analogous to the case q = p α . Finally, suppose that q = q β for some β = α. As in the previous case q = p β , we can conclude that for all γ, δ ∈ X p,α,β , if δ ∈ E then γ ∈ D ∩ E. As above, we assume that Z q β is not in M and we let i be the least ordinal such that C i = X p,α,β . After choosing γ 0 , δ 0 in the recursive construction of D and E, there is still a pair γ 1 , δ 1 such that γ 1 / ∈ F + i = F i ∪ {γ 0 , δ 0 }, since Y p,α is a proper class. If possible, this pair is chosen such that δ 1 / ∈ E ′ i . But then γ 1 is put into E \ D and δ 1 ends up in E. However, we have already argued that this cannot occur. But then for every such pair γ 1 , δ 1 ∈ X p,α,β with γ 1 / ∈ F + i , we have δ 1 ∈ E ′ i , and so Z q β is contained in the set F + i , which is a contradiction. By Claim 2 and since A α ∈ M , we have that
Since Y p,α is a proper class, so is Y p,α ∩ D ∩ E by our construction, and hence there must be some γ ∈ (Y p,α ∩ D ∩ E) \ B. Let now q ≤ P p such that q PḞ (α) =γ and take a Q-generic filter G with q ∈ G. ThenḞ
Therefore there is some r ∈ A α ∩ G. Take s ∈ G with s ≤ Q q, r. Then s Qγ =Ḟ (α) ∈B, contradicting the choice of γ. Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc and P embeds densely into Q. It is easy to see that then Q also satisfies the Ord-cc and so by Example 6.4, (3) it is very nice.
Conversely, suppose that P contains a class-sized antichain. We would like to extend P via a dense embedding to a partial order which is not very nice. Since P satisfies the forcing theorem, P has a Boolean M -completion. As we are only interested in a dense property, we may therefore assume that P is already an M -complete Boolean algebra.
By the proof of Lemma 4.4, we can find three disjoint subclasses of our given class-sized antichain, each of which contains a subclass which does not have a supremum in P. Denote these subclasses without suprema by A, D and E, and let B = A ∪ D and C = A ∪ E. Claim 1. At least one of sup B and sup C does not exist in P.
Proof. We show that if both sup B and sup C exist, then so does sup A, contradicting our choice of A. Since P is an M -complete Boolean algebra, if sup B and sup C exist, then so does p = sup B ∧ sup C. We claim that p is already the supremum of A. It is clear that every element of A is below p. It remains to check that A is predense below p. Let q ≤ P p. Since B is predense below q, there are r ≤ P q and b ∈ B with r ≤ P b. Since C is predense below r, there are s ≤ P r and c ∈ C with s ≤ P c. In particular, b and c are compatible. But they both belong to the antichain B ∪ C, so b = c ∈ B ∩ C = A.
Let Q be the forcing notion obtained from P by adding sup B and sup C. By Lemma 1.10, Q satisfies the forcing theorem. Moreover, it follows from the separativity of P that Q is separative. We show that Q is not very nice. Consider the Q-name σ = { { 0 , sup B }, sup C }.
By definition, ½ Q Q σ ⊆2.
Claim 2. There is no nice Q-name τ such that ½ Q Q σ = τ .
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that τ = {0} × A 0 ∪ {1} × A 1 , where A 0 , A 1 ∈ M are antichains of Q, and ½ Q Q σ = τ . Observe that A 1 ⊆ P, since if for example sup B ∈ A 1 and G is Q-generic with sup B ∈ G and sup C / ∈ G, then 1 ∈ τ G \ σ G . The same works for sup C. Therefore sup A 1 exists in P. We claim that sup A 1 is the supremum of A.
Firstly, we show that every element of A is below sup A 1 . Suppose for a contradiction that there is a ∈ A with a Q sup A 1 . Then by separativity of Q there is p ≤ P a with p⊥ P sup A 1 . In particular, p is incompatible with every element of A 1 . Hence if G is a Q-generic filter with p ∈ G then 1 ∈ σ G \ τ G , contradicting our assumptions on σ and τ . Secondly, we check that A is predense below sup A 1 . Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is p ≤ P sup A 1 with p⊥ P a for each a ∈ A. Now A 1 is predense below p, so there exist q ≤ P p and r ∈ A 1 with q ≤ P r. Again, this yields that for any Q-generic filter G with q ∈ G, 1 ∈ τ G but A ∩ G = ∅, so it is impossible that sup B and sup C are both in G. Hence 1 / ∈ σ G , contradicting our assumptions on σ and τ . We have thus shown that sup A exists in P, contradicting our choice of A.
This proves that Q is not very nice.
The proof of Theorem 6.7 actually shows that every notion of forcing P which satisfies the forcing theorem but not the Ord-cc, can be densely embedded into a notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem and is nice but not very nice. To see this, it remains to check that the partial order Q constructed above is nice. This follows from the following more general result:
Lemma 6.8. Suppose that P is a notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem. If P is nice and Q is obtained from P by adding the supremum of some subclass A ∈ C of P, then Q is also nice.
Proof. Let σ ∈ M Q and p Q σ ⊆γ for some p ∈ Q and γ ∈ Ord M . Let σ + denote the P-name obtained from σ by replacing every ocurrence of sup A in tc(σ) by ½ P , and let σ − be defined recursively by σ − = { τ − , p ∈ σ | p = sup A}. Let q ≤ Q p. Without loss of generality, we can assume that q ∈ P. If q is incompatible with every element of A, then q Q σ = σ − . But then there are r ≤ P q and a nice P-name τ such that r P σ − = τ and so r Q σ = τ . If there is some a ∈ A such that q is compatible with a, let r ≤ P q, a. Then r Q σ = σ + and so as in the previous case we can strengthen r to some s which witnesses that σ + has a nice P-name.
Corollary 6.9. Suppose that M = M, C is a countable transitive model of GBC − . Every notion of class forcing which satisfies the forcing theorem but not the Ord-cc is dense in a notion of class forcing which is nice but not very nice.
Open Questions
Assume that M is a countable transitive model of GB − and that P is a notion of class forcing for M. By Corollary 3.4 and Theorem 2.4, if P preserves either Replacement or Collection, then P satisfies the forcing theorem. By Theorem 3.3, if P preserves Separation and satisfies the forcing theorem, then P preserves Collection, and hence also Replacement. It would thus be very interesting to know the answer to the following question.
Question 7.1. Assume that M |= GBC and that P preserves Separation. Does this imply that P satisfies the forcing theorem?
In Section 5, we proved that over models of GBC − , pretameness is equivalent to the EMP for partial orders which satisfy the forcing theorem. In order to prove Theorem 6.6, we work in KM, since our proof uses that the forcing theorem is preserved when adding infinitely many suprema to a given notion of class forcing that satisfies the forcing theorem. KM implies that every notion of class forcing satisfies the forcing theorem. The following question arises.
Question 7.4. Can pretameness be characterized in terms of the existence of nice names for sets of ordinals in GBC?
Every proof of the failure of the forcing theorem for first order definable notions of class forcing that is known to the authors (see [HKL + 16, Section 7] and Theorem 2.9 of the present paper) uses the nonexistence of a first-order truth predicate in the ground model. This motivates the following question. Let us emphasize that we ask for definable notions of class forcing in the above. Let F denote the notion of class forcing provided in [HKL + 16, Definition 2.4], for which the forcing relation is not definable. It should be easy to define a version of F relative to a first order truth predicate T , not only coding the ∈-relation of the ground model by a binary relation on ω, but also coding the truth predicate T by a unary relation on ω. If the forcing theorem held for that version of F, this would yield a truth predicate for the structure M, ∈, T inside of C, an assumption that is strictly stronger than asking for the existence of a first order truth predicate in C. So if M is as in the above question, then there is a notion of class forcing for M that does not satisfy the forcing theorem, however it is not definable over M, ∈ .
